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"The pen is mightier than the sword." 
Edward Bulwer-Lytton, Richelieu, 1839. 
INTRODUCTION 
In his film role as General George Patton, George C. Scott appears 
in triumphant glee overlooking the sandy plain where Erwin Rommel's 
decimated tanks lie ablaze. He gloats: "Rommel, you bastard, I read 
your goddamn book!" Elsewhere, reflecting on that same dark period of 
German history, many have claimed the Allies would have done well to 
anticipate, and perhaps might even have pre-empted, Hitler's rise to 
power and aggression, had they read and carefully analyzed his Mein 
Kampf. 
Writing recently in the Washington Post from the perspective not of 
analysis but of politics, former United States U.N. Ambassador Jeane 
Kirkpatrick has argued that there are "no excuses" for terrorism: 
The issue that should concern us is not whether in their 
heart of hearts, gunmen seek goals beyond the violence 
they perpetrate. The issue that should concern us is the 
violence itself. Terrorist acts are the issue, not the 
motives or sincerity of those who commit them.1 
While her underlying political premise is open to argument in the minds 
of many, the fact is that, objectively, one of the keys to understanding 
terrorism in its varied manifestations is the analysis of these "excuses" 
cited by the terrorists themselves. Terrorism is, after all, a set of tactics, 
not a belief system. 
The following discussion argues that a careful reading and analysis 
of what today's terrorists are saying can reveal unique and essential data 
with which to assess and perhaps to help anticipate their actions and in-
tentions. Moreover, if such analysis of terrorist texts is to be useful, it 
must exploit recent linguistic findings and not rely solely on political 
science's traditional, lexically-based quantitative (content analysis) 
methodology. 
The contemporary terrorism phenomenon remains a deadly, serious 
challenge to the policymaker, the traveller, the uninvolved bystander, the 
security or law enforcement officer, the military professional, and the 
terrorism analyst. Nevertheless, it is the analyst whose task is most com-
plicated by the nature of the terrorism phenomenon itself. The 
clandestine lifestyles and tradecraft of terrorist groups, their surprise hit-
and-run tactics, minimal size, retention of the operational initiative, and 
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endless spectrum of potential available targets makes terrorism analysis a 
difficult and often frustrating task. 
To be effective and utilitarian, terrorism analysis must avail itself of 
any and all promising information, perspectives, disciplines, and 
methods. Traditionally, these include: intelligence collection (severely 
limited by terrorists' operational security and caution in recruitment); 
political analysis of the terrorists' avowed goals or cause, their operating 
environment, and the group's motivations; psychological research into 
violent behavior and into what Eric Hof fer terms "true belief"; ex-
amination of the actors' individual biographies and assessments of 
evidence revealing their intra-group dynamics; military tactics and sur-
rogate warfare; assessment of case studies and statistical and operational 
trends; and analysis of terrorist communicatons, an area too often 
neglected. 
It is this last named field, that of looking closely at what terrorists 
say in all the various manifestations, which warrants closer scrutiny and 
greater exploitation. This is especially true since it is terrorist recourse to 
language, in order to communicate demands, goals, feelings, and needs, 
which often provides the only first-hand evidence from which to discern 
and assess a terrorist group's attitudes and intentions. Often the only 
communications accessible are those the terrorists choose to publish, not 
those hidden in their safehouses. Every piece of information becomes im-
portant for what it may reveal about the terrorist group's capabilities and 
choices. 
In the process, the "how" of their communicative approach reveals 
much about the "what" of its content. However, just as Mein Kampf 
had no precise timetable or detailed game plan for Hitler's own "march 
through the institutions," terrorist texts contain few pure nuggets of in-
sights. Rather, they present an accumulated set of data and observations 
which augment those discernible via other disciplines. 
WHOSE LABELS WILL WE USE? 
It is arguable whether linguists or politicians have the better 
understanding of language. Certainly, those who seek or exercise 
political power, and those who formulate political leaders' statements, 
understand well the utility of language. Every speaker and every political 
movement seeks, consciously or otherwise, to impose its own labels, con-
cepts, terminology, and definitions on listeners.2 Is there any doubt that 
it makes a difference whether the world's media and governments "con-
demned" or "regretted" the Soviet attack on an intruding Korean 
civilian airliner, that a violent political group is made up of "terrorists," 
"guerrillas," or "freedom fighters"? Yet few focus on the central im-
portance of language. Those engaged in political analysis, either profes-
sionally or as critical citizens, need to note especially what linguists and 
philosophers call the "naming" or "labelling" process. 
Language is man's greatest and most maleable tool, long thought to 
be not only the key to learning but a sine qua non for human intelligence. 
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Language constantly changes shape, is capable of infinite permutations, 
and yet, despite our differing experiences and definitions of meaning, re-
mains the one inescapable medium of inter-personal communication. In 
many respects, however, language is also the mirror of the speaker, not 
just his tool. As such, it serves the speaker's intentions and simultaneous-
ly provides insights into the user. 
Language is manipulable, a fact one encounters clearly in wartime 
propaganda, political campaigning, advertising, fiction, romantic and 
other persuasive speech situations. It is no coincidence that these speech 
situations were those which first drew political scientists like Lasswell 
and Leites into analytical endeavours focused on semantic choices and 
their use for political ends.' Recent linguistic research has clearly reveal-
ed that each discrete use and user of language manipulates this tool with 
every utterance, choosing, and thus excluding, lexical items, grammatical 
structures, favored optics, the ordering of information, and in verbal 
speech, changing intonation, pitch, and stress.4 The analytical task then 
is not to condemn or bewail the manipulation of language, but to 
recognize and understand the nature, purpose, and effect of manipula-
tion as it occurs. 
One need only note the labels "hot autumn" and "peace 
movement" in the context of the West German debate over intermediate-
range nuclear (INF) missiles to recognize that major elements opposed to 
German government policy, though only a small minority of the popula-
tion, succeeded in winning acceptance of several carefully crafted 
political labels. Thanks to acquiescence by the government, the media, 
and the public at large, a minority of protesters won some measure of 
credibility and legitimacy for their "movement" and for its particular 
aims and methods. 
Had others not acceded to the coinages, which threatened a "hot 
autumn," expropriated the mantle of "peace" advocates, and claimed 
the numbers and organizational cohesion of a "movement" (as opposed, 
say, to "anti-war protesters"), the issues, debate, and political momen-
tum might have been quite different. By letting the minority usurp these 
labels, the established majority basically denied itself the use of these 
same labels and their favorable attributes. Evidence of concern on this 
score can be found in subsequent statements by U.S. political leaders to 
the effect that the U.S. military or NATO itself constituted the "real 
peace movement" or that the leaders themselves also belonged to "a 
peace movement." 
It is not coincidental or insignificant that labels terrorist elements in-
troduced into the German lexicon are reflected in the statements of 
leaders of the radical anti-nuclear Greens Party as well. For instance, 
speaking on the INF issue before the parliament in July 1983, then 
Greens leader Petra Kelly charged the Kohl government with 
"criminalizing" the "nonviolent" peace movement. Kriminalisierung is 
a coinage found throughout Red Army Faction and other German ter-
rorist writings. Kelly termed the government's acceptance of the NATO 
policy to site INF in the Federal Republic illegal, anarchist, and marked 
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by "enmity toward humanity" {menschenfeindlich). She warned against 
a recurrence of "genocide," of Hitler, and of the FRG becoming an 
"American (military) rear area" — all repeated themes of RAF texts 
from 1972 to the present.5 
Though seldom noticed and difficult to isolate, the impact of the 
West German terrorism experience on political discourse has been 
significant. Concurrently, the terrorist Red Army Faction's ambivalent 
approach to language and dialogue results from its realization that Ger-
many hardly is ripe for revolution. This undercuts their would-be effort 
to propogate a broader subversive uprising. RAF violence has had its ef-
fects but the inability to articulate convincing arguments for its use has 
been telling. Thus, the half-hearted verbal component of the faction's 
"strategy" has done little to win the crucial battle for public support and 
legitimacy. 
Analysis of a terrorist, event-related text demands that one separate 
fact from terrorist fiction, read between the lines, look for useful in-
dicators behind and beyond what is on the page, and render judgements 
based on analysis of both linguistic forms and contents. The 
manipulative characteristic of language is crucial in understanding ter-
rorism communications in that, just as terrorist violence emanates from 
the weak pretending to be strong, so it is with much of their speech. This 
is true especially in texts coinciding with terrorist events, as both the 
event and the text seek external attention and call prevailing values and 
perceptions into question. A fundamental objective, with language as 
with violence, remains the redirection of the populace's positive iden-
tification away from the government's and the establishment's 
legitimacy toward a belief that both moral and political legitimacy 
belong with the terrorists. As with violence, language is aimed at creating 
a vision of the RAF which is larger than life. 
It is the rare terrorist group that inflicts violence without also pro-
pagating some rationale, threatening other moves, explaining objectives, 
and damning perceived wrongs and injustices.6 Purists among terrorism 
analysts might even argue that the lack of a political message disqualifies 
violent actors from the "terrorist" label — that is, without a political 
claim, they become "criminals" or "crazies," in psychologist Frederick 
Hacker's paradigm.7 On the other hand, one can argue that in the case of 
Palestinian terrorism, for example, the track record of actions and the 
political context in which they are wrapped perhaps obviates a need for 
specific messages. Nonetheless, even the December 1985 attacks in Rome 
and Vienna indicate the assailants were prepared with some kind of 
political message had they had the opportunity to express it. 
The German case under study here is an apt one even in terms of the 
group's own chosen name, for the West German "Red Army Faction" is 
indeed much less than the name is designed to suggest. The group, in ex-
istence for some fifteen years now but having undergone several major 
generational and operational changes, is not a faction of the Red Army. 
Political scientists also question the adjective "red" if legitimate 
Marxist-Leninist credentials are implied, since these terrorists' eclectic 
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approach to communist ideology fits their pre-conceived anti-capitalist, 
"action" orientation. Finally, despite their reputation for major acts of 
violence, these Germans political actors do not comprise an army. In-
deed, their adversaries in government and media succeeded in superim-
posing the adversary label "gang," reserved for criminals and other 
ostracized elements. 
Where contemporary terrorists actually have achieved "strategic," 
not just "tactical" success, they have succeeded in convincing and in-
timidating political bystanders as well as in coercing or eliminating their 
various terrorist targets. To understand the tactics and appraise the pro-
spects of these and other terrorist groups and their campaigns, therefore, 
one must examine what they are saying — their "excuses" — and how 
they exploit language in pursuing their objectives. 
THE RED ARMY FACTION — A THUMBNAIL HISTORY 
The decision to study the German RAF is an appropriate one for 
several reasons. The group, active for nearly fifteen years, has had 
several generations of leaders. It operates in, and is a product of, a socie-
ty relatively similar to that of the United States in social structure, 
demography, industrialization, affluence, and cultural and moral values. 
The RAF clearly shares with the earlier U.S. Weathermen group and the 
terrorist Japanese Red Army origins in the student-dominated, anti-
Vietnam protests of the 1960s. Tactically, though suffering severe per-
sonnel losses necessitating at least three successions of leaders, it is a 
sophisticated terrorist entity whose primary targets have been the United 
States, in particular, its military, the West German political and in-
dustrial establishment, and NATO. 
In fourteen years, RAF terrorists have killed a half-dozen U.S. ser-
vicemen and a dependent wife, have bombed (with casualties) major 
U.S. military bases in Frankfurt, Heidelberg, and Ramstein, and have 
come within an eyelash of assassinating SACEUR General Alexander 
Haig and U.S. Army Europe Commander-in-Chief General Frederic 
Kroesen. In short, excepting perhaps the totality of pro-Palestinian and 
radical Shiite terrorism, the RAF has posed a more direct danger for a 
longer period to American interests, facilities, and officials than has any 
other active terrorist group. 
The history, personalities, operational cycles, psychology, and 
socio-political impact of the Red Army Faction (known earlier as the 
Baader-Meinhof Group or Gang) is well-documented elsewhere and need 
take little space in this discussion.' Significantly, many leaders have been 
jailed or killed, only to be replenished some three or four times, over two 
dozen noteworthy attacks are attributed to the RAF, and its tight-knit 
core has never been extinguished. It continues to mount selective, well-
planned attacks on American, NATO, West German, and related in-
terests in Western Europe. 
From its inception in the period 1967-72, the RAF captured the at-
tention, and often the imagination, of the West German and other 
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Western publics. Many media initially romanticized them as the political 
equivalents of Bonnie and Clyde. However, soon large numbers of Ger-
mans came to consider the RAF a threat to German democracy and 
stability, reminiscent of the fascism which brought Hitler to power. 
(Julian Becker's title, Hitler's Children, seeks to capitalize promotionally 
on this very point.) On the other hand, the RAF has failed in its half-
hearted attempt to mobilize a large number of supporters, nor has it 
spawned similar guerrilla formations in Germany or elsewhere. These 
revolutionary calls, though effective, lack the kiU-or-be-killed fanaticism 
of the RAF. That said, RAF acceptance of the notion that there may be 
more than one legitimate way to skin the revolutionary cat is a new 
phenomenon, unique to the RAF's current generation and one which is 
still evolving. 
A thumbnail operational history of the RAF begins in its 1968-72 
formative period during which a group headed by Andreas Baader, 
Ulrike Meinhof, Horst Mahler and Gudrun Ensslin and distilled from 
German youth's anti-Vietnam war protest element centered in university 
cities, chose "to take arms against a sea of troubles" and oppose with 
force what they saw as U.S. imperialism and fascist West German com-
plicity. The initial six attacks in May 1972 were directed at the U.S. Army 
and at West German institutions, the judiciary, the police and the conser-
vative media. Following the group's rapid operational denouement dur-
ing that summer and the subsequent search by the RAF's surviving se-
cond echelon for new leadership and direction, German terrorists 
generally tended to use the .years 1974-76 in an effort to regroup, spen-
ding a part of this period in the Middle East. In some cases, there were 
decisions to join with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
(PFLP), participating in the 1975 seizure in Vienna of OPEC oil 
ministers and the 1976 hijacking of an airliner out of Athens, an act 
which ended with an Israeli Commando assault at Uganda's Entebbe air-
port. 
The PFLP connection proved useful when, in 1977, the RAF 
assassinated the German attorney general and then sought twice to kid-
nap German captains of industry to force the release of imprisoned com-
rades, as they had attempted unsuccessfully by seizing the West German 
embassy in Stockholm in 1975. When Dresdner Bank chairman Robert 
Ponto resisted their assault, they shot him in his living room. However, 
in September 1977 they succeeded in seizing Daimler-Benz executive 
Hanns-Martin Schleyer, a close friend and advisor of then-Chancellor 
Helmut Schmidt. By this juncture, the RAF's targeting had moved from 
anti-U.S., or imperialism, to anti-capitalist German business, though the 
selection was not necessarily any more dictated by doctrinal than by 
operational considerations. 
Despite terrorist efforts, the Bonn government refused to release the 
RAF leadership, and PFLP's added leverage through the seizure of a 
Lufthansa aircraft collapsed after a successful German counter-terrorist 
assault in Mogadiscio, Somalia. A profound sense of disillusionment 
seemed to grip the surviving RAF cadre. Their role models, Baader, 
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Meinhof, and Ensslin were now dead in controversial suicides committed 
in prison. Nonetheless, the new level of operational sophistication and 
commitment which the incidents of 1977 had demonstrated also served as 
a milestone in the RAF's thinking. For the Faction, it was a year to be 
emulated. 
Thereafter, the RAF again focused on U.S. and NATO military in-
terests and personalities, namely, Generals Haig and Kroesen, and 
Ramstein and Rhein-Main airbases. Its 198S-86 target emphasis reflects a 
synthesis of anti-imperialist/anti-capitalist lines of thought, wedded in 
the convenience of focusing on NATO. For the RAF, NATO comprises a 
military entity, the army of imperialism, a U.S. tool using willing Euro-
pean regimes, and an institution spanning national borders which 
various other, non-German terrorists and resistance elements could all 
attack in parallel. This target synthesis accounts for defense industrial 
establishment targets including the recent murders of General Audran in 
France and of German defense corporation executives Zimmerman and 
Beckurts in Munich. Herein also lies the heralded "Euro-terrorism," 
which the RAF and others relish seeing overrated while they themselves 
admit, in their own writings, that it remains only a distant dream. Here is 
where textual analysis of RAF talk regarding its vision of a West Euro-
pean "anti-imperialist front" can bring us back down to earth. The mere 
fact that, while triumphantly acknowledging recent attacks, RAF texts 
call for revolutionary comrades "not to be overwhelmed by the dif-
ficulties of the challenges we face," reflects the faction's own analysis of 
the immensity of the task and the dangers of becoming demoralized. 
CASE STUDY AND METHODOLOGY 
Published RAF event-related texts or communiqués (in German 
parlance known as Kommandomeldungen or Bekennerbriefe) were ex-
amined first for the period 1972-81. Subsequently, similar texts from 
1982 through 1985 were analyzed in like manner. The objectives were: 
1) to determine the terrorists' attitudes toward and skills in the use 
of language and its importance in their overall operational and 
strategy considerations; 
2) to relate relevant findings of contemporary linguistics to a field 
of political analysis and to seek insights into the RAF's thinking 
and planning as revealed in event-based as well as secondary 
texts; and 
3) to correlate the linguistic form and content manifestations of 
one terrorist group across a spectrum of thirteen years of RAF 
texts in order to map patterns, enhance in depth understanding 
of West German terrorism, and indicate the areas and degrees of 
terrorist impact on West German political life in general. 
Various disciplines and perspectives are useful in such an effort: 
traditional content analysis, or "quantitative semantics"; linguistics and 
its subfield of pragmatics; psychobiography; sociolinguistics; psychol-
inguistics; and threat, or risk, analysis. One major shortcoming of the 
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established political content-analysis approach to text analysis, however, 
is its focus on word- and phrase-level meaning. Linguistic research 
highlights the broader plane of text-level and contextual meaning, the 
very areas most crucial for political analysis and also most troublesome 
to those seeking to apply computer technology to the problem. By ex-
amining entire texts, singly and in their inter-textual relationships, one 
can better grasp trends, patterns, and meaningful contrasts in and be-
tween texts. Many of those contrasts, in turn, have their basis and import 
outside the domain of language in the political and social environment of 
the speakers themselves, in this instance in tightly-knit, clandestine ter-
rorist cells. 
Another criticism of traditional content analysis is its heavy em-
phasis on language as the mirror of users, more than as a tool. Thus, in 
looking at the RAF or other terrorist use of language, the focus is equal-
ly, if not more, on language as the tool of political strategy. The 
manipulation of language, though a universal feature of human speech, 
tempts even the best linguists to succumb to moralizing on "good" and 
"bad" uses. Nonetheless, the objective should be to identify what is be-
ing done with language, with what means and to what ends, even as in-
sights into the terrorist group itself are sought. The fact that written ter-
rorist texts are deliberate, not spontaneous, speech and are the product 
of a group of people writing carefully over time, also renders psychol-
inguistics of marginal value. Many of the necessary individual, spoken, 
and impromptu characteristics of speech are missing. Likewise, aberrant 
speech patterns are extirpated in the process of group editing and retool-
ing of written texts. 
Using linguistics to plumb the intentions of the RAF through its 
communicated textual output presupposes a thorough grounding in the 
RAF's history, origins, tactics, operational preferences and demon-
strated capabilities, attitudes toward like-minded groups (violent and 
otherwise), leading personalities, public reception, and sense of mission 
and strategy. Keys to these data are found in the details of RAF attacks, 
biographies of leaders, generic tactics and tradecraft of terrorist groups, 
public opinion surveys, and contemporary West German political 
history. Moreover, RAF doctrinal writings, miscellaneous cor-
respondence, other terrorist autobiographies and isolated interviews pro-
vide indispensable insights. 
The overall analysis undertaken for this study involved close ex-
amination of early RAF literature concerning group doctrine, its applica-
tion of and borrowings from Marx, Lenin, and theorists of urban guer-
rilla warfare, and initial RAF attempts to "talk" young Germans into 
becoming revolutionaries. Although those attempts clearly failed, the 
early treatises, especially those of Ulrike Meinhof and Horst Mahler, 
provide much of the foundation and ideological wellspring of the RAF to 
this day. Scholarly appraisals of these early tracts agree, for the most 
part, that "action" per se is foremost in RAF thinking ("das Primat der 
Praxis") and that the grounding in Marx which the RAF touts lacks the 
will or ability to accept or assimilate key aspects of Marx. 
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This is particularly true in the context of violence, revolution, and 
the terrorists' conviction that the demise of capitalism, while foreordain-
ed, can and must be expedited.' Moreover, contemporary political 
philosophers such as Herbert Marcuse, Theodor Adorno, and Johan 
Galtung left an imprint on the earliest RAF leadership which still colors 
the group's thinking. To cite only one example, Galtung's thesis of struc-
tural violence as an inherent characteristic of large institutions serves as 
the basis for much of the RAF's claim to be operating essentially in self-
defense and self-preservation. 
There are also, of course, uniquely German factors behind the 
RAF's development. Germany's Nazi past and the moral indignation of 
many youth in the late 1960s and the 1970s over perceived German 
"complicity" with U.S. imperialism (or at least aggression) in Vietnam 
and elsewhere in the developing world have played a pivotal role. As 
well, personal frustrations and individual psychological factors related to 
familial situations no doubt played a part in certain cases. 
Given this backdrop drawn from other disciplines and equipped 
with the linguistic skills pertinent to carrying out text-level analysis in the 
native language of the communications, the trained analyst can exploit a 
terrorist groups' communications (texts) for insights not otherwise to be 
gained, even via traditional word- or phrase-level content analysis. Iden-
tifying key lexical items and methodically tabulating them is a necessary 
but insufficient part of text-linguistic analysis. Meaning is neither fully 
communicated nor fully grasped in anything less than a given text, that 
is, in one self-contained body of speech, be it a sentence, paragraph, 
page, communiqué, treatise, newspaper column, conversation or even an 
entire book. Humans communicate in texts, not in words or phrases. 
THE TEXTS 
Using a linguistic approach to RAF texts, it is important to note how 
sparse the evidence is in each short text (generally only one communica-
tion per incident, excepting the 1977 Hanns-Martin Schleyer kidnap-
murder) and the expressed disdain by early RAF leaders of the need to 
resort to language. They resent the "passive," impotent means with 
which all other political actors make do, in order to explain themselves 
and their aims. At the same time, looking at thirty or more event-related 
RAF texts, drafted with great care between 1972 and 1985 and subjected 
to rewriting and editing, one finds inter-textual evidence which indicates 
changes and variations in group attitudes, moods, intentions, political 
emphases, and targets. 
For example, in addition to the RAF's operational track record, the 
event-related texts, both those referring to attacks and to hunger strikes, 
shift in thematic emphasis from anti-imperialist, anti-U.S. targeting over 
the Vietnam issue in the earliest period through a period of heavier focus 
on economic inequalities and German corporate magnates in the late 
1970s to the current anti-defense/industrial establishment emphasis ting-
ed with a new, avowedly "communist" flavor as well. Operationally, 
this has been revealed most recently in attacks on persons and facilities 
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identified with arms production and other military matériel for NATO 
and U.S. allies in Europe, particularly the 1985 and 1986 assassinations 
of General Audran in France, carried out in cooperation with Action 
Directe, and of Dr. Zimmermann and Dr. Beckurts in Munich. 
Scrutiny of the RAF communiqués laying claim to the most recent 
anti-U.S. military attacks and the comparison of these communiqués 
with 1972 anti-U.S. RAF texts reveals telling similarities in some respects 
but changes in others. The RAF has always held that the German 
worker, for whose benefit the group at times has claimed to be waging its 
struggle, is hopelessly co-opted by German material comforts and is 
beyond the reach of revolutionary ideals or motivation. Secondly, the 
RAF, as with any terrorist group which must operate in fear of being 
identified, penetrated, and apprehended, is a staunchly exclusivist, 
hierarchial group. It never attained the size or organizational complexity 
of the Italian Red Brigades, but based on the RAF's highly selective ap-
proach toward both operations and recruitment such were never avowed 
or implicit RAF goals. Thus, in West Germany and West Berlin there 
emerged not a set of RAF units, but other, less tightly-knit groups, in-
cluding the Revolutionary Cells (RZ), the now defunct Movement Two 
June, and various ad hoc smaller groups on the periphery. Indeed, the 
RZ routinely has capitalized on this very contrast with the RAF in its 
own call for the spontaneous creation and operation of other "Revolu-
tionary Cells."10 Even given a new RAF acceptance of other legitimate 
forms of "resistance," the RAF still insists on a clear distinction between 
those worthy of the hallowed mantle of "guerrilla" and all others not so 
exalted. 
The RAF's corpus of writings encompasses doctrinal texts, event-
based communiqués, letters and exhortations to supporting groups, 
political declarations not tied to violent acts, and court trial (defense) 
statements. Two former German terrorists have published 
autobiographies; neither of them belonged to the RAF, but their com-
ments are not irrelevant to understanding the RAF and its political 
milieu. ' ' The number of available RAF interviews can be counted on one 
hand, and most were either handled via written questions or subjected to 
editing. The most recent, and an exception to the rule, is that of Klaus 
Juenschke which appeared, excerpted, in die tageszeitung (taz).11 Im-
prisoned RAF members, as a group and individually, generally have been 
uncooperative with persons seeking to draw political or psychological 
profiles of them. No more demeaning assault on their political commit-
ment apparently can occur than to have their revolutionary credentials 
explained away as some kind of psychological pre-destination or aberra-
tion. Moreover, the RAF remains convinced that founding-mother 
Ulrike Meinhof was subjected to psychological torture and manipulation 
while imprisoned. 
The statements made by RAF co-founder Horst Mahler in his con-
versations with then German Interior Minister Gerhard Baum cast light 
on the motivations and aspirations of the first RAF generation.13 They 
clearly spell out the moral indignation of the group over the perceived 
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continuation of fascist dominance over German political and economic 
institutions, RAF Utopian thinking, and despair over the futility of tradi-
tional means of protest. Having failed to attract proponents to its revolu-
tionary approach and being continually criticized by the non-violent 
West German left, the RAF evolved into an isolated group of terrorists. 
The terrorists sought to: 1) prove their ability to perform significant ter-
rorist acts, thereby building their case for the effectiveness of guerrilla 
warfare while embarrassing the government; and 2) communicate their 
political thinking, view of the future, calls for support, and justification 
of violence in an effort to rend the German political fabric. Their in-
creasingly obscure texts remained, until 1982, almost solely limited to the 
time of actual attacks and without reference to the political controversies 
of the day in West Germany (peace, nuclear, and ecology issues) which 
were the focus of the mainstream political left's attention. 
Study of RAF texts reveals the group's attitude toward, and skills 
in, language, the sense of a need to communicate to various audiences, 
and motivations. With one notable exception, however, the RAF's tex-
tual history is marked by a concatenation of isolated texts (one per inci-
dent or event) rather than a continuing flow of communications. This 
complicates the analysis and supported by collateral evidence from other 
disciplines, at least until recently, gave analysts strong reason to conclude 
that RAF terrorism is more a highly dangerous political temper tantrum, 
than part of a cohesive revolutionary strategy — regardless of how 
unrealistic the latter might appear to be. 
In the single instance where a series of closely connected texts allows 
insight into RAF thinking and behavior, careful analysis reveals 
linguistic cues to changing moods within the group which could have 
been, and perhaps were, helpful in gauging RAF actions and reactions. 
The texts issued during the 44-day Hanns-Martin Schleyer kidnapp-
ing/murder incident in September and October 1977 clearly show the 
growing frustration and despair of the RAF terrorists as time passed 
without the desired FRG government capitulation to demands to free 
eleven major German terrorist leaders in jail. The tone of the texts — laid 
down in adjective selection, sentence and text length, sentence rhythms, 
and types of labels and denunciations employed — illustrates significant 
changes in the writers' emotions. 
The initial Schleyer text, simply claiming credit for his seizure 
without any denunciation in all but the last sentence, communicated the 
demand for the cessation of police searches for the victim ("or he will be 
shot") and listed six conditions for his release. Interestingly, other than 
to call Schleyer a "fat magnate of the nation's economic cream" the text 
offered no political or economic rationale for his seizure and expressed 
no particular anger. Further, the confident tone of the first letter is 
noteworthy, as is the RAF's implicit expectation that one of its condi-
tions, that the full RAF communiqué would be read on nationwide even-
ing television news, would not be met. 
Initially, almost superhuman in their sense of confidence and con-
trol, observable by the use of "imperative adverbials" such as "quickly, 
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immediately, unlimited, at all times," the RAF terrorists lost that 
momentum within five days of their trimphant seizure of Schleyer, soon 
resorting to hapless reiterations of previous, totally unmet demands. 
"We are getting tired of repeating ourselves" is coupled with boxing 
themselves in linguistically through the repeated, increasingly limp 
phrase "for the last time" in three successive letters over a four-day 
period. Five days into the incident, the terrorists had won no concessions 
from the German government and then, resorting to the formal, police 
form of address "Ihnen," telephoned to warn of dire consequences yet 
again. In the end, the German texts show them almost pleading to be 
spared the need to kill their victim, an act which became increasingly 
dependent upon the necessity to save face with a worldwide audience of 
political observers and revolutionary brethren, especially those external 
powers with whom the credibility of RAF capabilities and threats had to 
be attained. 
RAF texts tied to events follow a basis format which blends elements 
of newspaper reporting, correspondence, and the political tract. Almost 
all begin with a headline which is not a news summary but a credo or 
revolutionary call to arms. The second basic element is the "event 
report" — the who, what, where and when. Formerly, this routinely in-
cluded a "how" element inserted to ensure that the RAF's claim to have 
perpetrated an event was accepted. The RAF therefore provided specifics 
of the event or technical details which would be known only to the 
perpetrators, for instance, the makeup and location of a bomb. This 
RAF practice has now given way to an immediate political declaration in 
the body of the texts, presumably on the assumption that the group's 
credibility is fully established and that it need not lower itself to prove its 
claim. The initial event report/claim is usually devoid of denunciations 
and threats. 
In the core of the text, the political context and rationale for the ter-
rorist act is laid out. It contains the RAF's political Weltanschauung 
which supports their reason for carrying out the attack and understand-
ing its purpose. This part of the text is the longest, the most important 
for analysis, and often most obtuse in its syntax and lexicon. The Ger-
man language is renown for complicated structures given to multiple 
clauses, a heavy reliance, in academic writing, on nouns, and generally 
complex syntax; all appear in this portion of most RAF texts, rendering 
them virtually incomprehensible to all but reasonably well-educated Ger-
mans. After some 80 to 650 words dedicated to the rationale behind the 
RAF attack event-texts conclude with one or more additional calls-to-
arms, "revolutionary pep talks," and a group signature with a comman-
do name, the RAF name, and its own logo, and perhaps that of an ally. 
As noted above, a basic critical finding concerning the RAF's use of 
language and its reliance on written texts to reach its audiences is that, 
with very rare exceptions, only one text (message unit) is produced for 
each RAF attack. That is, the group issues a single statement, always 
after the attack, never in anticipation of it, and makes no recourse to a 
second pronouncement. (The Schleyer operation was the exception.) 
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Chronologically, the government and media always have had the last 
word, except in one case where the RAF denied responsibility for bomb-
ing the Hamburg rail station. Nonetheless, in a detailed examination of 
RAF event-based texts, one finds: 1) insights into the group's thinking 
and its evolution; 2) attempts, in a single text, to reach differentiated au-
diences, victims and their peer groups, the government, the left, and 
uninvolved observers, with similar arguments; 3) the reluctant accep-
tance of the need to communicate at all; and 4) attitudes toward, and 
capabilities to produce, effective statements. 
THE RAF ON LANGUAGE 
Actual RAF commentary pertaining to language, though less 
specific and plentiful than that of the RZ terrorists, who in one instance, 
list the preparation of the political statement as the first phase of plann-
ing an offensive operation, documents the concern of the RAF leader-
ship that the group's spartan statements accurately and unambiguously 
reflect its politics thus making them less susceptible to misinterpretation 
or government manipulation. A case in point was the insistence, in the 
initial Schleyer text, that the government publish the totality of the 
RAF's letter "ungekuerzt und unverfaelscht," uncut and unfalsified.14 
RAF leader Gudrun Ensslin's ire over a support group's use of the vital 
label "political prisoner" in a way which, she claimed, could have in-
cluded Rudolf Hess in its meaning and her insistence on brevity is 
another illustration of concern with language and labels.13 Similarly, 
RAF reference to "forced feeding" (Zwangsernaehrung) of hunger-
strikers, rather than use the government's preferred neutral term "ar-
tificial feeding" (kuenstliche Ernaehrung), has been explicit and careful-
ly calculated to convey the charge that the state itself is committing 
violence and human rights abuses whenever it keeps RAF hunger-strikers 
alive." 
The complete set of RAF texts illustrates deliberate variances in the 
RAF's language-based claims to specific events. The text writers, for ex-
ample, routinely resort to passive voice or impersonal verbs in describing 
any unintended injury or killing of victims — especially to an agent-less 
"passive of deceit" which omits the "by whomever" element in order to 
create distance from an event. For example, in the unplanned shooting of 
Ponto, the text refers to "ponto and the shots which struck him." The 
active voice and action verbs, are used when the writers want to attest to 
their own sovereign control over external events and hold on their victims 
lives. Here the RAF relies most often on military vocabulary, both in 
keeping with standard revolutionary practice (theirs is a "war against im-
perialism," or "war against war," in RAF parlance, Krieg dem Krieg), 
and in seeking to emphasize RAF power, retention of the offensive, and 
depth of commitment. In these contexts, an "army" presumably has to 
talk like one in order to impress others with its strength and ability to 
wage war. 
Terrorism is a group phenomenon. Thus, it is no great surprise that 
one looks in vain for the first person singular in any RAF text. The texts 
instead stress "we-they" dichotomies, tending to say much less in 
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positive self-appraisal about the RAF than about the enemy, particularly 
with negative comments about imperialism, the U.S. and West German 
governments, and prevailing power structures generally. The textual 
space devoted to negative portraits of adversaries, both institutions and 
conditions, is three or four times as great as that given to self-depiction. 
Even in the most recent period of greater attention to communicating 
with other groups, the vast amount of space is devoted to vitriolic but 
coherently argued attacks on adversaries rather than to the RAF itself. 
Terrorism — a set of violent tactics or threats of violence used to in-
duce fear in order to obtain political objectives through intimidation and 
coercion — rests on a projection of threat and the means necessary to 
lend that threat ample credibility in order to create favorable political 
leverage. RAF texts themselves, however, are virtually devoid of specific 
linguistic threats or commands identifiable via traditional content 
analysis. For example, there are few "if ..., then" or grammatically im-
perative constructions. The same holds for any "do this or else" phrases, 
aside from the Schleyer case in which the prolonged kidnapping involved 
dynamic RAF-to-government communications. Instead, threats and 
demands are realized through indirect linguistic means at the level of the 
entire text rather than in sentence units. Thus, though it comes as no par-
ticular surprise to schooled analysts, one cannot find the explicit terrorist 
threats which most policymakers and security managers are eager to have 
pinpointed. Rather, it is the tone or content of entire texts which conveys 
the sense and contours of "the threat." One needs to analyze each text in 
detail first and then to step back from the text, to reconstruct and 
paraphrase it, and finally to draw insights from that combined approach 
and from comparison with other texts in the RAF corpus. 
1982-86: ANTI-IMPERIALIST FRONT, "FIGHTING TOGETHER," 
AND "EUROTERRORISM" 
Viewed pragmatically and tactically, the practice of communicating 
only once concerning any single action produces strong, if circumstan-
tial, evidence that the elitist RAF indeed has sought no broad constituen-
cy of political support, desired no real dialogue with the radical German 
left (as Meinhof once did), and engaged in no major recruitment cam-
paigns. Recent evidence, however, points in a slightly different direction. 
Beginning perhaps with a 1982 RAF letter published in a West Berlin 
alternative newspaper (taz), which called for a united anti-imperalist 
front, one can see the onset of a new RAF line of thought and argument 
which continues to this day." However, before discussing the current 
outlook, it ought to be noted that the 1982 manifesto explicitly excluded 
any thought of new RAF units or recruits. In marked contrast with the 
egalitarian Revolutionary Cells (RZ), the RAF's revolutionary hubris has 
yet to dissipate. 
Between the Schleyer incident in September/October 1977 and 
mid-1982, there was no apparent RAF attempt to engage the German left 
in a meaningful political dialogue. In July 1982, the long tract alluded to 
above broke this silence. It was a convoluted, rambling plea for more 
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anti-imperialist struggle alongside, but beneath, the RAF. The text, 
though neither easily analyzed nor event-related, warrants close scrutiny 
for in it the RAF signals an ideological, philosophical, and even opera-
tional course adjustment. The text calls for a three-pronged revolu-
tionary onslaught, thereby according, from the elitist RAF, some revolu-
tionary legitimacy to those other "resisters" in the FRG who fight but 
are not among the "chosen people" of the guerrilla RAF. Those three 
resistance segments are guerrillas, prisoners (captured guerrillas), and 
resisters. 
Admittedly, it is with the benefit of hindsight that one is inclined to 
investigate the rambling July 1982 tract. But, given the RAF target and 
propaganda stress on anti-imperialism, the text shows a gradual target 
synthesis of capitalism and imperialism which blends into attacks on the 
NATO defense industrial establishment. (Again, a contributing factor, 
remains NATO's geographic breadth and availability of NATO property 
targets to groups which will not go beyond hit-and-run facility bombings 
and strafing, such as the RZ.) 
With the French Action Directe, in the case of the January 1985 
assassination of French General Audran, and in the subsequent shooting 
of defense firm officials Zimmermann and Beckurts in Germany the 
civil-military, the defense-industrial target link has been made. NATO, 
the RAF claims, is a U.S. imperialist tool in Europe. NATO's "adop-
tion" of the current U.S. policy line concerning methods of counter ter-
rorism is, for the RAF, not only proof of that concentration, but the 
basis and justification for their own "counter-attack." 
From its July 1982 tract in taz through the attacks on U.S. military 
personnel until late 1984, the RAF was building toward a broader base of 
political action coincident with domestic turmoil in West Germany over 
the placement of new NATO nuclear missiles on German soil. In late 
1984 and early 198S an RAF prisoner hunger strike, the third of its kind 
and breadth, was again to be a stimulus for public attention and to serve 
as a counterpoint and diversionary move for the Audran and Zimmer-
mann assassinations. Indeed, the RAF prisoners ceased their fast im-
mediately upon receipt of the news of Zimmermann's death, drawing 
'cat calls' from other leftists for their claim that eating was all right again 
since the RAF's actions outside prison had reached a "new threshhold." 
The hunger strike declaration, longer than other event-texts, again 
cites starvation as the guerrilla weapon of last resort, explicitly says the 
strike is modelled on the IRA hunger strike of 1981, and claims (not 
without some basis) that starvation can be a potent weapon. The state-
ment reiterates dominant RAF themes that the U.S. plans to rule the 
world (Weltbeherrschungsplaene) by annihilating all enemies in libera-
tion movements (Nicaragua) and guerrillas (the RAF). Through 
technological imperialism the U.S., in the RAF view, seeks to envelop 
Europe in the U.S. transition to a wartime economy preparatory to a 
first-strike against the Soviet Union, a contention anticipated by Brigitte 
Mohnhaupt, with reference to SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative), in a let-
ter from prison to the outside." 
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However, even though they held that NATO is a U.S. instrument of 
suppression, the RAF hunger strikers claimed that each individual still 
can be effective in reversing the march of imperialism. In saying so, the 
RAF for the first time focused specifically on internal German and 
broader European political and security issues: public oath-swearings by 
the armed forces (Bundeswehr); the holding of NATO ministerial 
meetings; "police violence" against "peace resisters"; the construction 
of the new runway at Frankfurt airport (Startbahn- West); and NATO 
munitions transports across Germany. As they have done periodically 
for fourteen years, the RAF writers insisted that Europe must become a 
military front against the United States and that American troops in 
Europe must not be allowed to relax, retrain and refresh in a "quiet Ger-
man hinterland," from which they are poised to launch imperialist wars 
into third areas. 
In an ensuing dialogue within the left (much of it conducted in taz) 
concerning the RAF, its hunger strike, and the attacks in which it played 
a role, few commentators outside the group agreed, as the group claim-
ed, that the RAF's actions had achieved more than the cumulative efforts 
of the "peace movement." Yet most agreed that, even were that the 
cause, neither the RAF nor the "peace movement" had made more than 
a minor dent in NATO. They would concede that the RAF had com-
plicated NATO's security and public relations concerns, but little else. In 
one editorial reflection, even taz itself assessed the RAF hunger strike 
statement as proving "the RAF's political thinking (remains) miles apart 
from that of the Green-Left scene."20 
CURRENT OUTLOOK — TEXTUAL INDICATORS 
In this necessarily cursory look at RAF texts, several statements 
from imprisoned RAF leaders concerning their assessment of the 
political situation confronting them and those still active in operations, 
and the two letters claiming credit for the August 1985 bombing of 
Rhein-Main Air Base and the shooting of U.S. Army member Edward 
Pimentai, are perhaps the most interesting. Before turning to those texts, 
examining a taz interview with imprisoned RAF member Klaus 
Juenschke, who has broken with the group, offers some useful insights. 
Stating that he re-read RAF texts from 1972 to prepare for the interview, 
Juenschke bemoans the current lack of dialogue. Claiming that the 
original RAF texts gave "concrete answers to concrete questions," he 
asks where this now exists and argues that the present RAF does not 
engage in dialogue because it realizes its own end is imminent should 
such a dialogue commence.21 
The mere fact that the RAF and its "legal periphery" were putting 
out a newsletter by 1985 in an attempt to build support, to focus the 
resistance activities and targeting of outside groups, and to claim the lead 
in building a "West European anti-imperialist front" is significant. Even 
though the earliest RAF leadership repeatedly referred to their interna-
tional connections, with the exception of links with the Palestinians, 
there was little evidence to support such claims. By printing a paper 
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entitled "Fighting Together" (Zusammen Kaempfen), in which the 
statements of various guerrilla groups are disseminated and in which the 
RAF responds to external events and comments, the group has evolved. 
How long it will publish Zusammen Kaempfen (ZK), how open to 
criticism the RAF is, and whether the group would consider relationships 
which demand it subordinate its independence in order to improve 
cooperation, are matters open to serious question. 
Even a quick perusal of issues three and four, July and September 
1985, respectively, of ZK reveals useful data, containing, as they do, infor-
mation on the last two major anti-U.S. RAF undertakings, the Rhein-
Main bombing and killing of Pimentai. It is in ZAf that one first encounters 
explicit RAF calls for and identification with a "communist" solution for 
the benefit of the "proletariat." Not since Meinhof has this been a core 
argument, and it comes at a time when established Western European 
communist parties, save in Italy, are in decline. Here the RAF refers with 
greater clarity than before to the imperialist threat directed against the 
Soviet Union, seemingly highlighting the "red" in Red Army Faction. 
One of the most interesting aspects of the late 1985 issues of ZK is 
the focus on U.S. government policy statements concerning terrorism, 
on American efforts to broaden support for an offensive counter-
terrorist stance, and the RAF 'interpretation,' or blatant distortion, of 
American statements on terrorism, especially those of Secretary of State 
George Shultz. From his speeches, his Senate testimony, and from 
American and West German news analyses, they buttress their claim that 
"U.S. state terrorism" has become NATO policy. In assessments at-
tributed to Adelheid Schultz, Rolf-Clemens Wagner, Christian Klar, and 
Brigitte Mohnhaupt, the RAF's current world view and targeting 
arguments emerge.22 
Secretary Shultz, they assert, has taken over crisis management of 
West European governments and the true "international terrorism" is 
that envinced in the My Lai, Sabra and Shatila massacres. The RAF 
claims that Shultz' emphasis on military solutions demonstrates the 
political bankruptcy of imperialism. This theme, that the use of force or 
violence is only legitimate in the hands of the non-state "counter-
revolutionaries" — the terrorists — runs throughout RAF texts. Its 
thrust is to redefine the rules so that the underdog RAF alone can adopt 
the means of war, while its enemy has to play by different, more constric-
ting rules. Thus, it is almost laughable, though hardly insignificant, to 
hear the RAF repeatedly accuse the United States and other institutions 
of authority of acting "without scruples" in selecting the means and 
methods of "warfare." 
The whole ZK argument seeks to reverse the assignment of 
legitimacy, morality, and humanity from the state and its institutions to 
the RAF. "Prisoners" are "state hostages," anti-terrorism efforts 
become "state terrorism," and use of military or other means of force 
are a resort to "fascist" wars of "annihilation, genocide, final 
solutions." For every external terrorist action which occurs, RAF 
prisoners contend they become the victims of acts of state vengeance. 
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Moreover, they cite remarks attributed to Secretary Shultz to the ef-
fect that fighting terrorism cannot always be "clean" as nothing new; the 
state's "terrorist" response to the guerrilla challenge has always been dirty 
and inhumane. Indeed, Mohnhaupt laments that the RAF coinage of 
Isolationsfolter ("isolation torture," more generally known as "solitary 
confinement") has become a value-neutral term. Generally accredited to 
Meinhof, the term's negative load in the 1970s did much to generate 
popular protests against the alleged persecution of imprisoned terrorists. 
After a decade of use, the RAF regrets that the term has lost its punch." 
The RAF's political analysis, though now admitting more avenues 
of resistance than their own as well as a more explicit identification with 
communist aims, retains the basic contours it has had since 1972. 
American imperialism, bound together with the political and military 
complicity and the overall inhumanity of multi-national capitalism, re-
main the adversary. Further, despite the difficulties, the United States 
and its military, both national and within NATO, remain an inescapable 
principal target in the RAF's "war against war." 
In August 1983 the RAF bombed Rhein-Main U.S. Air Base, co-
located with Frankfurt's civilian airport, killing two and wounding 
others. Just prior to that attack and a necessary, according to the RAF, 
precursor to it, the RAF shot and killed American serviceman Edward 
Pimentai to acquire his military identification card allowing the group to 
breach base security and plant its bomb. The Rhein-Main claimant letter 
was sent in the commando name of George Jackson, chosen as an 
American, a "revolutionary," a Soledad prisoner, and a "persecuted" 
black. 
The letter lambasted imperialism, called for proletarian interna-
tionalism to seize the offense, and claimed "West European guerrillas 
develop their strategy as they attack." Insisting that the imperialist 
machine had escalated its own offensive, the RAF called for attacks on 
all fronts. As the RAF prisoners had done in ZK issue number 3 in July, 
the letter writers denounced imperialism's "dirty methods." They 
argued recent bombings elsewhere had been state provocations, threaten-
ed retaliation in Lebanon and Nicaragua, and labelled President 
Reagan's call for "one Europe from Lisbon to Moscow," imperialism's 
vision of domination extant since 1917. They choose not to treat Soviet 
references to one Europe "from the Urals to the Atlantic." 
After its broad political prologue, the Rhein-Main letter listed two 
RAF calls for revolutionary courage to attack the imperialist enemy. It 
then proceeded to lay out the RAF's "facts," justifying this particular 
Rhein-Main attack, essentially reiterated later in the first half of the 
Pimentai letter. The RAF described Rhein-Main Air Base as a pivotal 
location for imperialist intervention in the Third World, a "nest of 
spies," and the real reason for building the new runway at Frankfurt Air-
port (Startbahn-West), the mainstream German left's cause célèbre for 
the last five years. The letter was dated August 8 and carried both the 
RAF and French Action Directe as signatories, even though there was no 
trace of the latter group in either the attack or the text. 
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The letter corresponded in part to the RAF's Vietnam-era language 
which sought to depict Germany as a rest and recuperation area for GI's, 
and linked with the 1981 Ramstein bombing claim, almost exactly four 
years earlier, which spoke of imperialist war returning to Europe and 
described the "battle against international terrorism" as a NATO 
smokescreen to annihilate opponents of its war strategy. But the Rams-
tein letter, coinciding with the crescendo of anti-nuclear missile senti-
ment in West Germany, dwelt principally on Ramstein's alleged com-
mand center role in unleashing and managing nuclear war in Europe. 
Nowhere in the Rhein-Main letter is there a reference to the RAF 
murder of Edward Pimentai. That claim letter dated August 25, was 
separate and arrived belatedly. Its text was organized to explain, excuse, 
and defend the RAF killing, in accurate anticipation of criticism of the 
murder. It began with reference to the Rhein-Main bombing. In the 
space of two sentences, however, the RAF veered from listing its major 
objective, that of taking a principal American military power center out 
of action, to merely disrupting the function of some equipment. The let-
ter then drew the avowed political link to Pimentai, claiming that anyone 
who helps Rhein-Main operate, as do "all the soldiers who do their jobs 
in the headquarters or elsewhere," was a legitimate target. With this 
tenuous slide from macro- to micro-target, the RAF entered into a 
defensively-worded discourse on how killing Pimentai might be justified 
politically, not just as a logistical necessity. Every soldier was a 
volunteer, was an enemy in war, and RAF action against them was no 
different than the Salvadoran FMLM attack on the American Marines in 
Central America or the TWA hijacking by the "Organization of the Op-
pressed of the World." 
Two-thirds of the way through the text, which is unusually late 
placement for the actual event-report, the RAF in contradiction to all the 
foregoing political rationale, said it shot Pimentai because "we needed 
his ID-card to drive onto the base." Having anticipated criticism from 
the non-violent German left for deliberately killing a common soldier, 
the RAF went on to argue that it had no "social worker perspective" on 
American soldiers in Germany and refused to see them both as actors 
and victims. The RAF stressed that Pimentai and his cohorts were 
volunteers, not Vietnam-era draftees, that he and they gave up a civilian 
job to earn more "bread" by making war, and that everyone making 
such a choice had best realize that membership in the war-making, 
American military makes one fair game for the RAF. It should be noted, 
of course, that few, if any, American servicemen would ever see the 
German-language RAF text intended to intimidate them. Despite all ef-
forts to argue otherwise, it is clear from the defensive tone, the delay in 
claiming Pimental's killing, and the structure of the claim, that the RAF 
simply needed an ID card. 
In the September 1985 ZK interview with alleged "RAF comrades," 
planted to deal with criticism of Pimental's murder, the RAF admitted it 
erred in not sending in the claim letter at the same time it sent authorities 
Pimental's ID card. Asked why they had killed Pimentai, the RAF 
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respondents replied in a rambling discourse that the imperialists 
escalated the challenge and they responded in kind. They did not indicate 
why Pimentai could not simply have been robbed of his card, yet they 
went to some lengths to rationalize his killing in political terms. The fact 
that a GI was stationed in Germany, rather than in Central America, was 
no reason for letting him 'off the hook.' The RAF-GI relationship was 
one of war. Nevertheless, as they again admitted, they killed Pimentai 
because, "without his ID card, the bombing was impossible." Then, in a 
crucial passage, they noted: 
(W)e are naturally not saying that we are going to shoot 
every GI who comes around the corner — or that com-
rades should do that. One can only do that in a concrete 
situation which clarifies itself in the political-practical 
orientation of the attack. That is to say, it is a tactical 
question." 
The ZK interview concluded with the RAF explanation of the extent 
of guerrilla cooperation in Western Europe. Just as governments cannot 
address themselves to issues in public without being heard by the ter-
rorists, they also cannot address their would-be flocks without being 
overheard. The RAF in this text rejected the notion of a European-wide 
"central committee" or even of an RAF-Action Directe, organizational-
logistical bond. The fact remained that each group determined its own 
concrete actions, according to the RAF, in terms of its own decisions, 
operational conditions, and role in national resistance. As long as 
ideological differences did not become political barriers, "the com-
munist guerrilla groups" would remain the core and motor of the revolu-
tionary process. Nonetheless, the RAF's commentary, put in the context 
of the group's operational and communicative history, helps discount 
what others have been quick to label "Euro-terrorism." Rather, the texts 
show the RAF to be very pragmatic in appraising the likelihood and 
desirability of tighter cooperation and clearly indicate that the RAF is 
not about to surrender any of the sovereignty it has been so jealous of in 
its fourteen year battle against the "monster" of imperialism. 
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
The principal reason for the RAF murder of Edward Pimentai is not 
iron-clad, nor may one ever know if the delay in claiming this act resulted 
from internal RAF feuding over having committed it or how to justify it. 
But, had one not made a close examination of the various texts involved 
(letters, interviews, and precursor RAF texts), one would know much 
less. 
Throughout fourteen years of RAF texts and operations, the themes 
of anti-imperialism and anti-capitalism, along with anti-fascism, are in-
terwoven. The same holds for the target focus on the United States and 
West Germany as the two principal adversaries. With the United States 
the concentration revolves around its military, both for its purported 
lead role as imperialism's instrument and to embarrass the state's 
strongest source of force and power. Here the unabated RAF leitmotif of 
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establishing a second, diversionary front enters in; German targets bear 
the brunt of the RAF's anti-capitalist focus. 
The RAF seeks to depict itself as the protector of humane and moral 
values, as a defender of egalitarianism, and as a valiant underdog waging 
an indefatigable war against overwhelming odds, against a force whose 
methods know no moral bounds. The RAF contends that it acts via self-
defense and self-preservation, as do all guerrilla groups that view 
themselves as victims of injustice and oppression by ruling 
establishments. Its lost comrades in state confinement allegedly are sub-
jected to torture, violence, and terror, a barely defensible claim in light 
of the considerable privileges and sources of information available to 
them. 
The RAF has failed to achieve anything beyond momentary, tactical 
successes because it can neither make credible its arguments for support 
nor deny the state its legitimacy and monopoly on the employment of 
force. Groups which resort to terrorist tactics as part of a broader revolu-
tionary strategy recognize that the violence they perpetrate remains inar-
ticulate as long as its purpose, value, and legitimacy are not effectively 
communicated to the general populace. They know, as Carlos 
Marighela, Abraham Guillen, Regis Debray, and others have insisted, 
that revolution demands a verbal strategy as well as a military compo-
nent. 
From Ulrike Meinhof's death in 1975 to at least 1984, the RAF prac-
ticed relative verbal isolation. It entertained no dialogue with the left, 
issued one short declaration for each operation, and seemed content to 
make no particular effort to win public support or sympathy. At the 
same time, the non-elitist Revolutionary Cells and their publication, 
Revolutionary Wrath, were drawing more and more attention, welcom-
ing copycat attacks and giving lessons in do-it-yourself terrorism. 
Moreover, the ecological-pacifism campaign took hold in Germany, the 
Green Party won 27 seats in the 1983 Bundestag election, radical 
dissidents continued to attack nuclear reactor and storage areas, and 
anti-war protestors drew hundreds of thousands into the West German 
streets. 
The RAF saw the turbulence in Germany as a threat and an oppor-
tunity. On the one hand, with a violent approach proving to be only one 
of several available, the RAF would be increasingly isolated and 
discredited. On the other hand, there were ample numbers of issues and 
people to generate greater turmoil directed at the ruling establishment 
and to use in calling prevailing institutional arrangements and political 
priorities into question. Yet, as has been their lot since 1972, though the 
RAF can find many who share their sense of grievance and animosity 
toward the German establishment and American influence in the world, 
few agree that the RAF's terrorism is useful, whether moral or not. 
Critics claim that the RAF lives in a distorted world of black and white 
distinctions which can only lead to frustration and self-destruction — 
hardly evidence that their spartan verbal strategy has proven the least bit 
effective. 
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This study has yielded several new insights and reinforced others. 
First and foremost, terrorist statements remain the most readily available 
and potentially productive avenue into comprehending terrorist think-
ing. The most promising approach to terrorist, and perhaps all political, 
texts is investigation at the text-level by analysts with native-speaker 
competency working on originals. Translation all but destroys text-level 
and contextual meanings in the socio-cultural context of the writers. 
Nuances are lost, metaphors overlooked, epithets are overplayed or un-
seen. The assessment technique requires both a content-analytical and a 
text-linguistic appraisal. 
In looking at the RAF and other terrorist groups issuing political 
and other statements concerning their actions — at their "excuses" if 
you will — one must engage in in-depth analysis of texts as they surface 
and in the context of their occurrence. Analysis must not rely solely on 
quantitative or statistical data but must examine, on a text-level, the 
questions of labelling, threats, speaker emotions, logic and argumenta-
tion, metaphors, text cohesion and development, and other related ques-
tions. The space available in this paper allows only incidental illustration 
of some of these avenues, but these and other text features, present or 
absent, enable one to infer certain things about the terrorists: (1) their in-
tended audience; (2) their sophistication; (3) their attitude toward claim-
ed constituencies; and (4) their ability to articulate political beliefs and 
their seriousness regarding those beliefs. 
RAF texts contain the most persuasive arguments the terrorists can 
muster to enlarge their following, if not their membership; they constitute 
a crucial body of information for comparison with other data, for exam-
ple, opinion research on popular attitudes. Terrorism is, after all, only the 
most extreme pole in a continuum of socio-political frustration and anger 
in those societies where it appears. As such, the texts prepared by ter-
rorism's users provide the political analyst or area specialist with the most 
starkly defined portrait of the political opposition, generational conflict, 
youth discontent, or general social malaise in the areas where it surfaces. 
Terrorists in the FRG are in one sense the most extreme example of a 
political alienation and repressed national assertiveness felt by Germans 
aged forty and under. These young Germans are gradually assuming the 
most influential positions in German politics, industry, labor, education, 
and the media. Indeed, at least half of the identified German terrorists 
were preparing for, if not already at work in, these very professions 
before going underground to combat the inflated adversaries they 
perceived at home and abroad. 
With the exception, perhaps, of the anti-Somoza revolutionaries in 
Nicaragua who relied only in part on terrorism, most of the world's con-
temporary terrorists have not managed to advance their efforts into a 
revolutionary insurrection capable of turning out the state or regime 
enemy. In Western Europe, at least, this is due largely to the prevailing 
factors of Western anti-violent, legal and moral values, basic social and 
economic well-being, viable political pluralism, and effective and accepted 
government institutions in all branches. From another perspective, West 
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European terrorist groups, in particular, German ones such as the RAF, 
have failed to convince their would-be constituencies of the truth of their 
accusations and criticisms or of the likelihood that any new, improved 
"revolutionary" order would result from success in their terrorist efforts. 
Just as physical violence cannot go on unimpeded, neither can ter-
rorist statements and claims go unanalyzed or unanswered. Whether 
American concern in centered on the Soviet ability to manipulate Euro-
pean attitudes toward NATO and American security policies or on the 
impact of a terrorist group on a given population, the task for analysts 
and public diplomacy is the same; they must effectively identify and re-
ject the adversary's labels and assert those of society's legitimate values 
and institutions. In the poignant words of one German commentator, 
"... a conspiracy of silence ... will always benefit the party capable of 
spreading the greatest fear." This holds true in the global strategic 
nuclear context as well as for the growing number of terrorists." 
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